On Conflict Transformation in Iraq

This study examines the effects of democratizing Iraq in relation to the stability of the state. The international relations theory of the democratic peace states that democracies do not fight one another. Elements of the theory have been applied to Iraq to seek democracy there in order to produce greater stability. Therefore, the purpose of the study was to discover what causal linkages exist between democratization and stability in Iraq. The level of violence in Iraq gradually increased as Iraq progressed from the first national elections in January 2005 to a constitutional referendum and then subsequent elections in December 2005 based on the ratified constitution. The former Sunnis elites turned increasingly to insurgency and sectarian conflict as electoral democracy deluded their wealth and power while transferring these to the Shiite and Kurdish majorities. Shiite areas became more stable as they assumed more political and economic power in the country enabled by elections and stipulations of the constitution favorable to Shiites. The research shows that establishing elements of democratic governance at the local level first has a greater chance of stabilizing states in governmental transition rather than starting from the national level. Population security is required while conducting regime transition to ensure relative neutrality in ethno-federalist states. Democratic reform does not in and of itself create stability in states experiencing internal conflict and can even exacerbate such conflict. A republican peace is more viable for stabilization in the short term as opposed to pursuing a liberal democratic peace in societies that have not developed the appropriate institutions. Nevertheless, Iraq can increase stability now by conducting local and provincial elections to enable legitimate regional leadership. This initiative can also eliminate the disproportionate representation currently retained by Shiite and Kurdish parties that came about after Sunnis